This paper summarizes the literature on hedge funds (HFs) developed over the last two decades, particularly that which relates to managerial characteristics (a companion piece covers the risk management characteristics of HFs). It classifies, the current HF literature, suggesting which critical problems have been "solved" and which problems have not been yet adequately addressed. It also discusses the effects of past financial regulation and the prospects for the effect of new financial regulation on the HF industry and its performance and risk management practices, and suggests new avenues for research. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of managerial characteristics for HF performance, and the successes and the shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated HF-related risk management tools.
Introduction
"Hedge Funds" (HFs) raise capital via private placements and from a limited number of qualified investors. According to information published in the "The City UK" (TCU) report 2 , at the end of 2011, there were more than 9,800 HFs reported worldwide with an asset value under management of $1.9 trillion. This value was still below the $2. 15 The specificities of HFs and of their managerial characteristics combined with the ongoing discussions, particularly in the U.S. and the EU, for imposing more restrictive regulation on the financial markets, with obvious implications on the HF industry, provided us with a unique opportunity to review the last two decades of academic literature on HF. The contribution of this paper is four-fold: (i) summarizes the literature on HF (ii) provides an alternative classification for the HF literature which makes it easier to identify both the most relevant contributions and the gaps in the literature; (iii) suggests which critical problems have been "solved" and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed; (iv) suggests new avenues for research and for new regulation related to HF and discusses the managerial characteristics of HFs addressed in the literature which may affect HF performance (a companion paper addresses the literature on HF risk management characteristics). This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we identify some key HF characteristics and discuss the effect of these characteristics on the HF performance. In section 3 we review HF papers which consider the effect of managerial characteristics on HF performance. In section 4 we conclude.
Hedge fund's characteristics

Managerial compensation and fee structure
Typically the HF fee structure is divided into an asset based (or flat-rate) management fee and a performance-based (option-like) incentive fee, with the latter dependent on the "high water mark" (HWM) 5 and the "hurdle rate" (HR) provisions. 6 As the HF's manager (HFM) only shares the upside profit, so such an incentive fee contract (IFC) can be seen as a call option written by the investor on the HF's asset with a strike price determined by the HR, HWM provision and the net asset value at which each investor invests in the fund. The investments in the HF are associated with different net asset values (i.e. the net asset value of the HF at the time of each investment), consequently, the option-like performance fee has a strike price that varies with the time and is specific to each investor, and the overall IFC of the HFM is similar to a portfolio of call options each with, potentially, different strike prices.
Several authors have examined the effect of "incentive fees" (IF) on HF's performance and arrived at contradicting conclusions. For instance, Ackermann et al. (1999) , Liang (1999), and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) study the association between IF and risk-adjusted performance and report a statistically significant positive association between them. Their results suggest that IF is an effective tool to align the interest of both managers and investors. 5 HWM provision ensures that the HFM does not get his incentive fee unless the fund's net asset value exceeds its previous maximum net asset value. For example, the fund asset value in 2010 is $500M and the investment value falls to $300k. In 2011 the funds make a 100% return and the asset value is now $600M. The investors would only have to pay performance fees on that gain between the $500M and $600M, not the full 100% gain. 6 HR provision is the minimum return necessary to overcome in order the HFM to receive an IF. This rate is usually tied to a benchmark such as LIBOR or one-year Treasury bill rate. For example, suppose the HFM sets a HR of 5% and the fund returns is 15% on a year, so the IF relate the 10% return above the HR and not to the 15% return. Anson (2001) uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model to determine a suitable value for the option-like IFC and concludes that this option has a significant value and the performance-based incentive fee along with the requirement for HFM having their own money invested in the fund are the best ways to alignment the interests of both managers and investors. Koh et al. (2003) and Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) is able to reduce agency costs. They examine the effects of the HFM's decisions to close funds to new investors to prevent diseconomies of scale and report evidence that managers do not close funds unless there is a significant diseconomy of scale. Agarwal and Ray (2011) study the determinants and consequences of fee changes and whether the structure of fee changes (i.e. management fee percentage rate, IF, and HWM provision) are related to each other and to the fund's past performance and expectations for the future performance, using a dataset comprising information on the HF fee structure, for the period between April 2008 and November 2010. Their results suggest that the IF tend to increase over time and that this tendency is more frequent in younger and smaller HF than in older and larger HF. It appears that investors view the increase in the fee as a signal of managerial ability and reward those funds with a higher investment.
The above literature treats HF compensation fees as fixed payments, once they are made. Schwarz (2007) provides, however, a detailed cross-sectional analysis of fee variation and studies the effect on HFP and cash flow showing that management fees and IF are positively correlated with the lock up period which means that managers charging higher fees tend to have longer lock-up periods in their funds. However, investors do not view these fee levels as a signal of better future performance.
As mentioned earlier, HFMs hold a portfolio of call options on the HF value. The value of this portfolio of call options increases with the increase of the volatility of the HF value and 7 The delta of the call option embedded in the IFC represents the "dollar increase" in the HFM's compensation for a "one dollar" increase in HF net asset value.
the HFMs exercise these options if, at the maturity of the options, the value of the assets under management exceeds the strike price of the (IF) call options 8 . Fung and Hsieh (1997) find that when the IFC is out of the money, i.e. the current HF value is below the strike price of the underlying call options, contractual constraints, and reputational concerns may prevent managers from increasing risk. It appears that, once a good reputation is built, HFM tend to preserve it by following less risky management strategies. Brown et al. (2001) examine the association between the risk taken by HFM and reputational or career-management related concerns and conclude that poor relative performance and lowrisk premium increases the probability of HF termination and that the subsequent related reputation cost offsets the effect of IFC on risk taking. This pattern is more evident, however, for out-of-the-money (call options) IFC. Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007) examine the effect of the characteristics of the IFC on the RM behaviour of the HFM and show that HFs with IFC have higher downside risk than HFs without IFC, and that risk-taking behaviour is significantly reduced when HFM invest their own money in a proportion higher than 30% of the total value of the fund.
<Insert Table 1> 
Managerial flexibility
The lockup period is a window of time where investors are not permitted to redeem or sell shares. This period in addition to both redemption and notice periods are considered to be unique characteristics of HF which impose constraints on cash outflows avoiding liquidity problems. It is generally argued that imposing such constraints on investors enhances the possibility of generating higher returns by pursuing, for instance, long-term arbitrage strategies. Aragon (2007) notice period and redemption period in months, the lower is the likelihood of the fund closure and the higher is the loss in performance over time.
<Insert Table 2> 8 A relevant research question, however, is whether an increase in the HF volatility does carry a proportional extra management costs.
Size and age
Liang (1999) and Koh et al. (2003) study the effect of HF size, proxied by the HF assets value under management, on HFP and both arrive at the conclusion that the larger the size of the HF the better is the performance. It appears that HFs of larger size benefit from economies of scale and are more likely to attract new investors. Getmansky (2004) find, however, that there is a concave negative relationship between HFP and the size of the assets under management.
This finding suggests that there is an optimal asset value size to maximize return. The optimal asset size depends, however, on several variables, whose effect on performance can offset each other, such as past returns, fund flows, market impact and competition in the industry is a significant negative relationship between HF size and performance. He also studies whether HF allocates new capital efficiently as the inflows increase and shows that periods with high asset inflows are typically followed by periods where returns are below average. However, Kazemi and Schneeweis (2003) and Gregoriou and Rouah (2003) , using the stochastic discount factor approach and regression analysis for the period from 1994 till 1999, find no evidence of the effect of fund sizes on HF returns. Liang (1999) finds a negative relationship between HF performance and the age of the HFM and concludes that HFM of "young funds" (YF) 10 work harder to build up a reputation and consequently their funds achieve higher return performance. Howell (2001) defines YF as "funds with less than three years" and examines the association between the HF age (of young funds and seasoned funds 11 ) and HF performance. His results provide evidence that YF has 10 Young funds are referred to funds with less than 5 years. 11 Seasoned funds are funds that have been in the business for at least 5 years.
higher returns than seasoned funds. Koh et al. (2003) devotes his attention to the Asian HF industry and find no evidence that YF outperforms seasoned funds.
<Insert Table 3> 2.4. Diversification
The quest for creating the optimal mixture of HFs in a portfolio (i.e. to create funds of HFs) has grown enormously in the last decades, as an alternative way to generating a higher absolute return and optimising hedging strategies. We identify three main branches of the literature on funds of HF. One branch mainly studies the effect on performance of increasing the number of HFs in a portfolio of HFs. Two good contributions to this literature were given by Lhabitant and Learned (2002) higher return moments such as co-skewness and co-kurtosis, instead of normal skewness and kurtosis, and find that incorporating stocks and bonds into a portfolio of HFs leads to lower kurtosis and higher skewness compared to stand-alone HFs. 12 Efficient risk-return profile is referred as a profile which is able to yield the highest return with the lowest risk possible.
The third branch of literature focuses on how to construct an optimal portfolio of HFs considering both the risk and the return characteristics. The mean-variance approach is a widely used approach. Amenc McGuire and Tsatsaronis (2008), among others, provide an indirect method to estimate the average amount of the HF leverage, using an extension of regression-based style analysis with 13 Prior work on HF leverage used many different methods of collecting or computing the HFs' leverage but without using actual leverage data as in Ang et al (2011) paper. For example, some papers used static leverage ratios taken directly from fund databases. For example the work of Schneeweis et al. (2005) who empirically investigate the relationship between HFs leverage and their risk-return relationship using leverage at a point in time database. They find, on a strategy level, a systemic relationship between leverage and standard deviation, whereas on a fund level, they report little evidence of a systematic relationship between the use of leverage and the level of risk-adjusted performance. Some other articles rely on direct estimates for HF leverage such as Banque de that there is a consistent and systematic way to create pure alpha, using risk-return trade-off measures (through the Sharpe score), a pure volatility measure (through the standard deviation) and the beta exposure. He finds that HFs offering stable returns with limited volatility and/or with a limited exposure to the equity market consistently and significantly outperform equity and bond markets for both bullish and bearish markets. Abdou and Nasereddin (2011) study performance persistence of some strategies for different economic periods using the support vector mechanism (SVM), the neural network (NN) and the ordinary least square (OLS) methodologies. They find that the SVM has better prediction accuracy than the NN and OLS, and the HF returns performance related to different strategies are not persistent over the long-term. Indeed, only the returns of emerging market strategy were persistent during the recession 14 .
14 Emerging Market Strategy is part of Equity Long/Short HF style. They invest in all types of securities in emerging countries, including equities, bonds and sovereign debt. restrictions on the location of key service providers, which restrict human capital choices and hence tend to mitigate performance persistence, and (iii) distribution channels, which make the HF performance more opaque, decreasing the likelihood of performance persistence.
<Insert Table 6> 3. Managerial characteristics
Career concern and talent
Over the last two decades, an extensive empirical literature has been developed which helps to better understand the risk-return properties of HFs. Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, the study of the association between the managerial characteristics and performance of HFs has been neglected. Boyson (2005) "intelligence" and "education" as proxies for "talent" and "career concern", respectively.
They also include other variables such as the composite SAT score for the manager's undergraduate institution, the number of years of working experience, the number of years of working experience at a specific HF and the age of the HFM. They show that HFMs from higher SAT undergraduate institutions tend to take less risk and have higher raw 15 and riskadjusted returns and more inflows.
Timing ability
In previous sections, we reviewed the HF literature which focuses on the ability of the HFM to generate absolute returns. In this section, we focus on the HF literature which studies the timing ability of the HFM (i.e. the HFM's ability to invest in the right securities at the right time). The main approach that has been proposed to evaluate the timing ability is the "return- for timing ability in both market level (bear or bull markets) and market volatility on the US equity HF market, and report economically and statistically significant evidence of timing ability at both individual and aggregate fund levels. Moreover, they state that timing ability 15 Raw returns are the returns directly extracted from the database without any modification. 16 In order to compare return performance, risk and other HF's characteristics, HFs are categorized according to investment strategies ("styles") -e.g. Long/Short, Relative value, Event driven, and Tactical trading. appears especially strong during bear markets or when the market is more volatile, indicating that funds provide investors with protection against unfavourable market conditions. Cai and Liang (2012) use a dynamic linear regression model and find significant timing skill related to market return, liquidity, and volatility. Cao et al. (2013) investigate the HF managerial ability to take advantage of the market liquidity and conclude the existence of persistence timing skill over time.
<Insert Table 7> 4. Conclusion This paper summarizes the literature on HF developed over the last two decades, particularly that which relates to managerial characteristics (a companion paper considers risk management characteristics). We classify the current HF literature, and suggest new avenues for research considering the recent developments. We highlight the importance of the managerial characteristics on the risk-taking and HF performance, and the successes and the shortfalls to date in developing more sophisticated HF-related risk management tools and financial regulation. We discuss past development patterns in the literature and some critical problems which have been "solved" or have not been yet adequately addressed. 3-Large funds charge higher fees and are more likely to raise fees level. And Investors do not view fee levels as a signal of future fund performance.
Agarwal and Ray (2011)
Explore the determinates of fee changes and whether these changes are related to each other and to the fund's past and future performance
Cross-sectional analysis using simple regression 1-Managers tend to increase their fees more than decreasing them over time. This fee increase is more observable in younger and smaller fund.
TASS 3770
Apr. 2008-Nov. 2010 2-Investors view fee increases as a signal of managerial ability and reward these funds with higher inflows.
2-Compensation and risk-taking behaviour of HF managers
Fung and Hsieh (1997)
The role of incentive-fee and the reputation value on managerial risk-taking behaviour within HFs' survivorship framework
Regression Analysis
When the incentive-fee contract is out of the money, contractual constraints, and reputational concerns might alleviate managers' tendency to increase variance and risk TASS 526 (CTA Funds)
1990-1995
Brown et al.
Examine the risk of HFs in light of managerial career concerns Regression Analysis
There is a reputation cost that has a mitigating effect on incentives for taking extreme risk, especially when the incentive-fee contract is out of the money. 2-Risk-taking behaviour is significantly reduced when managers invest their own money (more than 30%) into the fund. 
